No work on the Moros would be complete without a discussion of the grave internal problem which may confront the rulers of the new Philippine Republic.

With independence a reality, one of the first problems of the Filipino will be to put his house in order. At best, the undertaking will be difficult and it may be accomplished with bloodshed. The importance of the problem of Filipinio-Moro relationships cannot be overstressed, as it will present a serious obstacle to the success of the infant Philippine Republic.

Opinion seems to be overwhelming that the Moro will fight. He bas no intention of submitting to the rule of Filipinos and he can probably be added to the Philippine "nation" only after a prolonged and bitter struggle.

The Filipino hates and fears the Moro, and these Christians of the northern islands share with the Spaniards an intolerance in religious matters which will not improve Filipino-Moro relations.

The Moro, on the other hand, views the Filipino with contempt. His word I, meaning slave, is the name of one of the largest tribes of Filipinos. In the old days, these I of the middle islands were taken by thousands into the harems of the Moros.

The Moro has a legitimate complaint as he watches America's preparations for leaving the Philippines. He has been disarmed. His privilege of carrying even a kris has been greatly curtailed and, with rare exceptions, he is totally forbidden the use of firearms. The not too blameless past of the Moro himself has of course been responsible for the complete disarming. For centuries he harried the Filipinos of the north.

If the Moro is not trusted with arms, he is at least provided with great freedom in his relations with America; his institutions and customs are not interfered with by the American administration.

The Moro would be distrustful of a Filipino holding a position of power. He would fear for the preservation of the customs of Islam, for he knows that the Filipinos are as devout as the hated Spaniards and that they have not forgotten the old days when the Moro was king of the archipelago.

Given arms, the Moro fears no Filipino. Disarmed, he looks to America for the protection she assured him. In many respects, his claim is just.

The Filipino, on the other hand, carries in his mind a memory of the old days of the juramentado and piracy. He has no assurance that these practices will not be resumed when America leaves the islands.

In this writer's opinion, the Moros will never submit to Filipino rule. Some years ago I had 400 Moros in my employ. The usual independence scare arose in the newspapers, with Congress debating the measure which eventually was accepted. A delegation of old Moros wailed upon me.

"Is it true, Senor," one asked, "that the Americans are going to leave and turn Mindanao and Sulu over to the Filipinos?"

"I only know what I see in the papers, Asari," I said. "Maybe independence will be granted and America will go home."

"If that be so, Senor, we must sharpen our krises. We love Americans and we trust them, but we cannot endure Filipino rule and we will die fighting."

A prominent Moro, who must remain nameless, recently made the following statement to me:

"I will never he able to hold my men in check under the rule of Filipinos. They will take to the hills and will never submit. The old days of jungle warfare I saw thirty years ago will return to Mindanao and Sulu."

In the event of armed resistance, the Moros would be greatly outnumbered by the Filipinos but they would have the advantage of fighting on their own soil and under conditions to their liking. Small bands of Moros, deep in the interior jungle, would be difficult to exterminate, and the cleaning up process, if successful at all, might well continue for many years.

The Moros have no arms except the kris and barong, but they make very creditable shot-guns from lengths of iron pipe, and ambuscades of Filipino troops would soon provide them with modern weapons.

An American army officer, who must also necessarily remain anonymous, recently remarked to me:

"I would like to have a box seat here in Mindanao where I could watch the Filipinos try to subdue the Moros. I am sure that a box seat would be much preferable to a field assignment against the Mohammedans."

There have been no Americans killed by the Moros for almost two decades, but three Filipino officers of the Constabulary were ambushed and speared by the Moros during one year, 1933. The Moros have a respect for Americans which they do not extend to the Filipinos.

The Moros laid down their arms and surrendered to America, with the understanding that America would protect them from aggression. Data Mandi, one of the finest of the Moro leaders, indicated this plainly in a speech before Secretary of War Dickinson in 1910:

"I am here, El Rajah Mura Mandi, representing the Moros. Here they are, the whole crowd of them, come to honor the Secretary of War. As I look about, I see far more Moros than Filipinos, that is the reason it is called the Moro province.

"When America first came here, from the very beginning, whatever they asked me to do, I did. I was loyal to them ever--now I hear a rumor that we Moros are in the hands of the Filipinos.

"In the Spanish times, I was a Datu. Then I saw and found out that things did not go well. When a man had two measures of rice, one was taken away from him; when a man had two head of cattle, one was taken away from him.

"If the American government does not want the Moro province any more, they should give it back to us. It is a Moro province--it belongs to us."

During the same meeting, the Moro Sacaluran came forward to address Dickinson:

"I am an old man. I do not want any more trouble. But if it should come to that, that we are to be given over to the Filipinos, I still would fight."

Ulankaya then arose and addressed the Secretary of War:

"I am not a civilized man but I have learned that slavery, killing and stealing is a bad thing. But if we are given over to another race, we had better all be hanged."

Thirteen years later, the Moro attitude had not changed. During the famous Rizal Day parade at Zamboanga in 1923, the Moros carried placards announcing:

"We Moros are not with the Christian Filipinos in their asking for Independence."
"We are not ungrateful to the United States."
"The voices of the Moros are not heard in Manila except by our friend General Wood."
"Whether Independence be given the Filipinos or not, we wish our Moro country to be segregated from Luzon and the Visayan islands."

The Wood-Forbes Commission, sent out to study the situation, heard the same expression of desire to remain under American rule when Ami Binaning spoke for the Maguindanao Moros:

"We Moros wish the protection of America. We wish to stay under the American flag."

It seems not beyond the bounds of reason to assume that the withdrawal of America from the Philippines may result in serious percussions which may be felt throughout Asia. A return of piracy and lawlessness to Mindanao and a possibility of grave civil war could well be the results.

The Moros are outnumbered numerically in a ratio of twenty to one, but the possible contest might not be as uneven as population figures would seem to indicate. There is a great nomadic population of Moros scattered all through the islands of Borneo, Celebes, Java and other parts of the East Indies, and many of them would doubtless rush to the aid of their blood brothers in Mindanao and Sulu. A Moro can smell a fight for a long distance.

It should be borne in mind also that the women of the Moros are no mean antagonists. In the event of active resistance to the Filipinos, they could be depended upon to take their place in the field.

It is not the purpose of this book to engage in any controversy over island politics except incidentally in-so-far as the facts might affect the Moro. But the possibilities of Filipino-Moro conflict cannot be ignored. The inclusion of this possibility is a logical part of any history of the Moro people.

It is possible that any friction of more than a purely local nature can be avoided if both races arrive at a mutual understanding and peace. It is also likely that the Filipino will bend every effort to attempt a peaceful settlement of the problem. The religions differences remain, however, as do the cultural and language barriers. These factors, coupled with the traditional enmity of the two peoples, make the problem of future relations a matter for real concern. The Moros are outspoken in their opposition to Filipino rule and it seems unlikely that the relations between the warlike Moro and the hot-blooded Filipino can be otherwise than strained.

With independence in the offing, the Filipino must devote every energy to the acquisition of a dear understanding of the problems of Mindanao and Sulu in order to avoid a repetition of the jungle warfare of thirty years ago. The understanding must be based, not upon the superior numbers and armed forces of the Filipinos, but upon mutual confidence and trust.

It remains for the Filipino to inspire this confidence, so lacking at present, and he must take the initiative in any attempt to establish a cordial relationship.

The Moro is poised at a crossroad. He can accept the peace the Filipino offers or he can, with equal facility, pick up the bloody kris he dropped at the battle of Bud Bagsak.

Original publication © 1936 E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.

Filipiniana Reprint Series © 1985 Cacho Hermanos, Inc.

This page (HTML format) © 2001 Bakbakan International. Transcription courtesy of Ashley Bass.